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M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cheek: Illinois
Adopts A Prejudice Standard for Policy Defenses
Based on Breach of Cooperation
INTRODUCTION

In M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cheek,I the Illinois Supreme
Court held that an insurer must be prejudiced by its insured's failure to cooperate before it could be excused from performance under
a liability insurance policy. Prior to Cheek an insurer was not required to establish that its policyholder's lack of cooperation had
actually prejudiced its defense of a claim under the policy.' A material and substantial breach of the duty to cooperate by the insured
was sufficient to release the insurer from its obligations under the
insurance contract.' Thus the Cheek decision imposes a heavier
burden on the insurer seeking an excuse from liability under the
insurance contract. This Comment will discuss the rationale and
purpose of the cooperation clause and will examine the impact of
the Cheek decision on insurance law in Illinois.
THE COOPERATION CLAUSE

The standard automobile liability insurance policy, is a bi-lateral
contract in which the insurer promises to pay all damages which the
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as a result of the operation
or ownership of the insured vehicle and to defend all claims brought
within the policy.' The insurer's undertaking is qualified by several
1. 66 IlI. 2d 492, 363 N.E.2d 809 (1977).
2. Mertes v. Ballard, 103 I1. App. 2d 171, 242 N.E.2d 905 (3rd Dist. 1968); Gallaway v.
Schied, 73 Ill. App. 2d 116, 219 N.E.2d 718 (1st Dist. 1960); Standard Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Kinsolving, 26 I1. App. 2d 180, 167 N.E.2d 241 (3rd Dist. 1960); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller,
17 I1. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1st Dist. 1958).
3. See authorities cites in note 2 supra.
4. A typical insurance policy provides as follows:
X insurance company. . .agrees with the insured. . .in consideration of the payment of the premiums and in reliance upon the statements in the declarations and
subject to all of the terms of this policy: to pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of: (a)
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter
called "bodily injury," sustained by any person; (b) injury to or destruction of
property, including loss of use thereof, hereinafter called "property damage"; arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the owned automobile or any nonowned automobile, and the company shall defend any suit alleging such bodily
injury or property damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms
of this policy, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or
fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient.
INsuR. L. REP. (CCH) Auto. Cas. 2d 2051-57.
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conditions including the cooperation clause.' Typically, this clause
requires the insured to disclose all the facts surrounding the accident and to assist in the settlement or trial of any suits brought
under the policy. The purpose of this clause is: (1) to prevent collusion between the insured and an injured claimant; (2) to enable the
insurer to fully investigate the facts of a claim; and (3) to facilitate
the insurer's conduct of any trial.'
Frequently accidents occur in which the injured victim is a friend
or relative of the insured. Not surprisingly, the insured might wish
to ally himself with the plaintiff to their mutual benefit. In other
cases, the insured's presence at the trial may be critical. If the
insured is the principal or only witness for the defense, his absense
from the proceedings may precipitate a judgment for the plaintiff.7
Thus, the cooperation clause gives the insurer confidence that he
will be able to conduct a proper defense.
Breach of the conditions of a liability insurance policy releases the
insurer from its obligations under the policy and terminates the
contract of insurance.' In Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co.,' an insured refused to render information to the insurer concerning a claim. Judge (later Justice) Cardozo, analyzing the legal
effect of this breach of the policy's standard cooperation clause,
stated:
Cooperation with the insurer is one of the conditions of the policy.
When the condition was broken, the policy was at an end, if the
A typical cooperation clause is as follows:
Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured-The insured shall cooperate with the
company and, upon the company's request, assist in making settlements, in the
conduct of suits and in enforcing any right of contribution or indemnity against any
person or organization who may be liable to the insured because of bodily injury,
property damage or loss with respect to which insurance is afforded under this
policy; and the insured shall attend hearings and trials and assist in securing and
giving evidence and obtaining the attendance of witnesses. The insured shall not,
except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or
incur any expense other than for such immediate medical and surgical relief to
others as shall be imperative at the time of accident.
INSUR. L. REP. (CCH) Auto Cas. 2d 2360.
6. Baumler v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1974); Schneider
v. Autoist Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Ill. 137, 178 N.E. 466 (1931); Latronica v. Royal Indemnity Co.,
8 I1. App. 2d 337, 132 N.E.2d 16 (1st Dist. 1956); 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§4771 (2d ed. 1961) thereinafter cited as APPLEMAN].
7. Schneider v. Autoist Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Ill. 137, 178 N.E. 466 (1931).
8. This result reflects the general law of contracts which holds that breach of a condition
does not give rise to an action for damages. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, §§134-35 (2nd
rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MURRAY].
9. 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928).
5.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 9

insurer so elected. . . . There has been a failure to fulfill a condition upon which obligation is dependent.' 0

Likewise, under an automobile insurance policy, an insured's
breach of the condition of cooperation relieves the insurer from his
duty to pay all claims resulting from the operation or ownership of
the insured vehicle.
Most jurisdictions treat the cooperation clause as a condition subsequent;" consequently the insurer must plead and prove the
breach. 2 Illinois is in accord with the majority. 3 In some instances,
the insurer may be precluded from asserting a breach of the cooperation clause through the doctrines of estoppel or waiver." If the insurer fails to promptly notify the insured that it intends to disclaim
its liability under the policy, either doctrine may deprive the insurer
of its defense. 5 The policy justification for application of these doctrines is that the insured relies on the insurer's conduct of his defense. The terms of the standard policy require the insured to permit
the insurer complete control of the defense of all claims brought
under the policy. 6 The requirement that the insured relinquish control of his own defense is theoretically sound only so long as the
10. Id. at 276-77, 10 N.E. at 369. A condition is subsequent if the occurrence extinguishes
a duty which had been previously active. A condition is precedent if the fact or event which
constitutes the condition must occur in order that the duty of the promisor be made active.
MURRAY, supra note 8, at §139. The distinction is not of substantive importance, for breach
of either type of condition will excuse the insurer from performance. The difference is important, however, for matters of procedure. Occurrence of a condition precedent must be pied
and proved by the party seeking to establish liability under the contract, whereas breach of
a condition subsequent must be pleaded as an affirmative defense by the party seeking to
disclaim liability (the insurer). See Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Keliher, 88 N.H. 253, 187 A.
473 (1936).
12. 19 ANDERSON, COUCH ON INSURANCE §79:347 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
CoucH]; O'Kelley, The Cooperation Clause as a Condition Precedent, 17 INS. COUNSEL J. 27
(1950); Comment, The Cooperation Clause in Automobile Liability Insurance Policies, 51
MARQ. L. REv. 434, 435 (1968); APPLEMAN, supra note 6, at § 4787.
13. Gianinni v. Bluthart, 132 Ill. App. 2d 454, 270 N.E.2d 480 (1st Dist. 1971); Cuttone
v. Peters, 67 Ill. App. 2d 1, 214 N.E.2d 499 (1st Dist. 1966).
14. Waiver has been defined as a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. An estoppel
is found when one's acts induce justifiable reliance by another. Comment, Insurer's Duty to
Defend, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1443 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Duty to Defend]; Comment,
The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. OF PENN. L. REV.
734, 736 (1966). Although the concepts are analytically distinguishable, in practice they are
not. 14 COUCH, supra note 12, at §51:116; MURRAY, supra note 8, at §189-193.
15. In State Farm v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 2 Ill. App. 3d 768, 277 N.E.2d 536 (3rd
Dist. 1972) the court found a delay of eight months was a waiver. Apex Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Christner, 99 Ill: App. 2d 153, 240 N.E.2d 942 (lst Dist. 1968) involved a delay of two months
and the court held no waiver. A delay of a year and a half was found to be a waiver in Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 282 (lst. Dist. 1958).
16. See note 4 supra.
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interests of the insured and insurer are identical or nearly so. 7 Consequently, the courts will not permit an insurer to continue to direct
the insured's defense while it secretly plans to disclaim liability.
Indeed, it would be unethical for the insurer's counsel to purport to
represent the insured when he is aware that the insurer intends to
invoke policy defenses and leave the insured solely liable for the
judgment. 9 The Illinois Supreme Court explained these considerations as follows:
When an insurer wishes to assert its nonliability under the policy,
it must notify the insured without delay. The reason is that the
claim might be of such a character as that the amount of damages
recovered in a lawsuit by the insured party would exceed the indemnity and subject the insured to considerable loss and damage,
and therefore the insured should have a right to know with reasonable promptness the attitude of the indemnity company, so that
he might be in a position to take such action as would not only
protect the indemnity company, but save himself from loss and
damages.2
The only exception to the insurer's duty to give prompt notice arises
when the insured cannot be located. To require notice under these
circumstances would unjustly deprive the insurer of its legal rights.
Thus, the insurer may proceed with the defense of the lawsuit with2
out jeopardizing its right to assert the policy defense. '
The insurer may use either a non-waiver agreement or a reservation of rights to preserve its legal rights.2 The former is a bi-lateral
contract in which the insurer agrees to defend the action and the
insured agrees not to claim waiver or estoppel if the insurer later
chooses to invoke policy defenses. 23 A reservation of rights is simply
a notice to the insured that the insurer does not admit liability
24
under the policy and will assert its policy defenses at a later time.
Under this method, the insured need not manifest his assent; it will
17.

See Comment, Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U.
L. REV. 734, 746 (1966).
18. Krutsinger v. Illinois Cas. Co., 10 Ill. 2d 518, 141 N.E.2d 16 (1956).
19. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, E-C 5-15 (1969) which states in pertinent part: "A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing
interests .. . "
20. Krutsinger v. Illinois Cas. Co., 10 Ill. 2d 518, 526, 141 N.E.2d 16, 21, (1956).
21. Durbin ex rel. Ferdman v. Lord, 329 Il. App. 333, 68 N.E.2d 537 (lsf Dist. 1946);
DeRosa v. Aetna Ins. Co., 346 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965).
22. Duty to Defend, supra note 14, at 1446; 16A APPLEMAN, supra note 6, at §9377.
23. Ancateau v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 318 Ill. App. 553, 556-57, 48 N.E.2d 440, 44243 (2d Dist. 1943).
24. Hinchcliffv. Insurance Co. of North America, 277 Il1. App. 109, 125 (1st Dist. 1934).
OF PENN.
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be inferred from acquiescence. 5 However, if the notice is equivocal
27
or ambiguous it will be held ineffective. 28 In Popovich v. Gonzales,
a telegram to the insured which stated "failure to respond. . may
be considered [a breach] and your insurance carrier can refuse to
satisfy the judgment, 28 was held insufficient notice to prevent a
claim of waiver or estoppel by the insured.
If the insured refuses to accede to the insurer's reservation of
rights, 29 the insurer is left with two alternative methods by which
to preserve its defenses. First, the insurer may seek declaratory
relief. Once an insured party has filed suit the insurer may get a
judicial declaration that it has been relieved of liability by reason
of its insured's breach of the cooperation clause2. However, prior to
that time there is no actual "case or controversy."'" Thus, declaratory relief is not a solution where the insurer merely wants to investigate the facts of an accident before the suit is filed. The insurer's
other option is simply to withdraw from the litigation. This course
of action is not advisable. If the insured loses the suit, collateral
estoppel might preclude the insurer from relitigating the facts of the
32
claim in a subsequent proceeding.
Thus it can be seen that to establish a policy defense, an insurer
bears a heavy burden of proof. The twin doctrines of waiver and
estoppel are often used to prevent insurers from evading their contractual obligations. As one court aptly observed, "In no field of law

is legal duty more rigidly enforced.
DUTY

. .

.

3

AND BREACH UNDER THE COOPERATION CLAUSE PRIOR TO CHEEK

Prior to the decision in Cheek, any material and substantial
breach of the cooperation clause by the insured would excuse the
insurer from performance. 34 Trivial instances of non-cooperation
were never enough to work a forfeiture,3 nor were misstatements or
25. Apex Mutual Ins. Co. v. Christner, 99111. App. 2d 153, 240 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dist. 1968).
26. Popovich v.Gonzales, 4 Il1. App. 3d 227, 280 N.E.2d 757 (Ist Dist. 1972).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 228, 280 N.E.2d at 758.
29. Comment, Estoppel, Third Party Practiceand Insurer's Defenses, 19 U. CM.L. REv.
546, 549 (1952).
30. Illinois courts have jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments where there is an actual
case or controversy. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §57.1 (1975).
31. Gibralter Ins. Co. v. Varkalis, 46 Il.2d 481, 485, 263 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1970).
32. Collateral estoppel provides that once a party or its privy has litigated a factual issue,
the party may not relitigate that same question if the original decision was adverse. See Apex
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Christner, 99 Il1. App. 2d 153, 161-63, 240 N.E.2d 742, 747 (1st Dist. 1968);
Comment, Estoppel of Coverage Defenses, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1459 (1969).
33. Popovich v. Gonzales, 4 Il. App. 3d 227, 231, 280 N.E.2d 757, 760 (1st Dist. 1972).
34. See generally cases cited note 2 supra.
35. In Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Haas, 179 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1950), the sole alleged
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falsehoods a breach, if seasonably corrected. 6 However, there was
no requirement that the alleged breach lead directly to judgment for
the plaintiff. 7 Thus, the plaintiff could not argue that the breach
was harmless because the insurer would have been liable anyway.
Sometimes the effects of a finding of a material and substantial
breach will be harsh. Stripped of his insurance protection a tortfeasor might be financially unable to satisfy a judgment against him,
leaving the injured plaintiff without compensation. To mitigate the
possibility that a plaintiff might be indirectly deprived of his only
source of recovery, the courts developed a doctrine of excuse and a
theory of reciprocal duties under the cooperation clause.
When the alleged breach is the failure of the insured to appear at
trial, courts have implied an affirmative duty on the part of the
insurer to use good faith and reasonable diligence to secure the
insured's attendance.3 The courts apply the following rationale: the
cooperation clause imposes duties upon the insured but does not
specify when or under what conditions the insured is to do particular
acts. Therefore, an obligation arises in the insurer to give the insured notice concerning what must be done to fulfill the condition. :"
When the clause is interpreted in this way, passive non-cooperation
is not a breach. For a breach there must be a refusal to cooperate.'"
Several cases exemplify the judicial approach to this problem. In
Durbin ex rel. Ferdmanv. Lord4 the insurer made no effort to keep
track of its insured's address changes for more than a year after his
deposition had been taken. The court held that under these circumstances the insured's absence from the trial was excused. Mazzuca
breach of cooperation was a misstatement concerning the location of the social event which
the insured had attended immediately prior to the accident. The court found no breach
because the falsehood was not material. See also Comment, The Cooperation Clause in
Automobile Liability Insurance Policies, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 434 (1968).
36. Rowoldt v. Cook County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 305 III. App. 93, 100, 26 N.E.2d 903,
906 (1st Dist. 1940).
37. Standard Mut. Ins. v. Kinsolving, 26 II. App. 2d 180, 190, 167 N.E.2d 241, 246, (3rd
Dist. 1960).
38. Hale v. Burnett, 5 111.App. 3d 33, 282 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist. 1973); Kress v. O'Hara,
14 I1. App. 3d 54, 302 N.E.2d 123 (1st Dist. 1972); Stamps v. Caldwell, 133 Ill. App. 2d 524,
273 N.E.2d 452 (1st Dist. 1971); Ray v. Johnson, 81 111. App. 2d 456, 225 N.E.2d 158 (3rd
Dist. 1967); 8 BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §342.11 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as BLASHFIELDI; 14 COUCH, supra note 12, at §51:113.
39. Panczko ex rel. Enright v. Eagle Indem. Co., 346 IIl. App. 144, 104 N.E.2d 645 (1st
Dist. 1952).
40. Janssen v. Worthington, 99 Il. App. 2d 125, 240 N.E.2d 709 (2d Dist. 1968); Gregory
v. Highway Ins. Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 285, 164 N.E.2d 297 (2d Dist. 1960).
41. 329 Ill. App. 333, 68 N.E.2d 104 (lst Dist. 1946). Accord, Terrel v. Multistate Insurance Exch., 54 Il. App. 2d 371, 204 N.E.2d 159 (1st Dist. 1964); Duffy v. Ft. Dearborn Cas.
Underwriters, 270 II1. App. 143 (1st Dist. 1933).
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v. Eatmon42 involved an insurance policy covering a fleet of rental
vehicles. Although the policy contained the standard cooperation
clause, the rental agreement made no mention of the duty of the
lessee to cooperate with the insurer. The court held that the insurer
had not reasonably informed the lessee of his duty to cooperate, and
consequently his non-appearance at the trial did not constitute a
breach. In Lawlor v. Merit Ins. Co.,43 absence at the trial was excused when the insured requested advance notice of the time of trial
in order to arrange his work schedule, but the insurer gave only one
day's notice. An insurer must also exercise reasonable diligence in
pursuing all plausible leads in attempting to locate the insured. For
example, in Penn v. Progressive General Insurance Co., 4 the court
held against the insurer because it had not attempted to contact the
insured through the loss payee on the policy.15 However, where the
insured is aware of his duties under the policy and is informed when
and where his presence is required, Illinois courts hold that willful
failure to attend a trial is a material and substantial breach which
relieves the insurer of all liability under the policy."
False or conflicting statements made by the insured prior to or at
trial are another frequently asserted breach of the cooperation
clause. The insured must give a full, frank, and complete disclosure
of the facts surrounding the accident, including the cause, condition, circumstances, and the conduct of the parties at the time. As
noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Home Indemnity Co. of N. Y v. Standard Acc. Insurance Co.:"
The insured must tell his insurer the complete truth concerning
the accident and must stick to this truthful version throughout the
proceedings. He must not embarrass or cripple his insurer in its
defense against a civil suit arising out of the accident by switching
from one version to another. He must not blow hot and cold to suit
his personal convenience. 9
42. 45 II. App. 3d 929, 360 N.E.2d 454 (1st Dist. 1977).
43. 27 II1. App. 3d 150, 326 N.E.2d 529 (1st Dist. 1975).
44. 74 Ill. App. 2d 32, 219 N.E.2d 857 (lst Dist. 1960).
45. A loss payee is the party named in the policy to whom proceeds will be paid upon
casualty loss. Typically, a creditor who has a security interest in an automobile will insist
that the proceeds of collision insurance be payable directly to himself as loss payee.
46. Mertes v. Central Security Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 171, 242 N.E.2d 905 (3d
Dist. 1969); Gallaway v. Schied, 73 11. App. 2d 116, 219 N.E.2d 718 (1st Dist. 1966); see also
Chertack v. Santangelo, 6 I1. App. 3d 201, 285 N.E.2d 905 (3d Dist. 1969).
47. Standard Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kinsolving, 26 Ill. App. 2d 180, 167 N.E.2d 241 (3d Dist.
1960); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 111. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1st Dist. 1958); Latronica
v. Royal Indemnity Co., 8 111. App. 2d 337, 132 N.E.2d 16 (st Dist. 1956); 8 BLASHFIELD, supra
note 38, at §342.16.
48. 167 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1948).
49. Id. at 924.
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Mistaken statements made in good faith by the insured are not
sufficient to breach the cooperation clause even where the statements destroy the insured's credibility in the minds of the jurors:5
Moreover, even if made with intent to deceive, a false statement
may be excused if seasonably corrected." But when disclosure of the
truth is delayed until the eve of trial, the insurer will be excused
from performance."
A related breach of the cooperation clause concerns refusals to
sign pleadings. However, a good faith refusal to sign court papers
will not void the policy, 3 since the insured is not obliged to combine
with the insurer to present a sham defense. An insurer may not
require its insured to swear falsely or contrary to the facts as the
insured knows them.
Courts view collusion between the insured and the injured plaintiff as a breach, 5 but will not construe a breach where the insured
merely gives the plaintiff a full and complete statement of the facts
of the accident. To be relieved of liability, the insurer must prove
55
dishonesty or bad faith. For example, in Gass v. Carducci,"
the
insured clearly sympathized with the plaintiff, her mother. She
demanded that the insurer pay the policy limits on the claim. Nonetheless, the court refused to find a breach of the cooperation clause
by the insured, because she attended trial when requested and, in
the court's view, gave truthful testimony to the best of her ability.
Similarly, in Jordan v. Standard Mutual Insurance Co., :'6 a minor
sued his father's estate after being injured in an automobile accident in which his father had died. Although the mother, as administrator of the insured's father's estate, openly aided the plaintiff by
hiring his attorneys and instigating his suit, the court held there was
no breach of the cooperation clause. The mother had attended court
when requested and had complied with every request made of her
by the insurer. It is a plausible inference that had her assistance to
50. Gass v. Carducci, 52 Il1. App. 2d 394, 203 N.E.2d 289 (lst Dist. 1964).
51. State Farm v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 2 Il1. App. 3d 768, 277 N.E.2d 536 (3d
Dist. 1972); Prudence Mutual Cas. Co. v. Dunn, 30 111. App. 2d 469, 175 N.E.2d 286 (1st Dist.
1961); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 111. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1st Dist. 1958); Rowoldt
v. Cook County Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 305 Ill. App. 93, 26 N.E.2d 903 (1st Dist. 1940).
52. Kirk v. Home Indemnity Co., 431 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1970).
53. Standard Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kinsolving, 26 111. App. 2d 180, 190, 167 N.E.2d 241, 246
(3d Dist. 1960); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Keller, 17 I1. App. 2d 44, 50, 149 N.E.2d 482, 485
(1st Dist. 1958); Bartkowski v. Commercial Ins. Co., 275 I1. App. 497, 502-03 (1st Dist. 1934);
8 APPLEMEN, supra note 6, at § 4777; 14 CoucH, supra note 12, at § 51:102.
54. Latronica v. Royal Indemnity Co., 8 111. App. 2d 337, 342, 132 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1st Dist.
1956): 8 APPLEMAN, supra note 6, at § 4779; 14 COUCH, supra note 12, at § 51:109.
55. 52 Il.App. 2d 394, 203 N.E.2d 289 (1st Dist. 1964).
56. 50 IIl. App. 2d 1, 199 N.E.2d 442 (2d Dist. 1964).
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the plaintiff taken the form of false and manufactured testimony,
the insurer would have been relieved of liability.
When the insured and the plaintiff collude in bad faith with intent to deceive the insurer, courts have found a willful breach of the
duty to cooperate. In Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Richardson,57 the insured admitted that he had given his insurer a
false statement regarding the circumstances under which his fatherin-law had been injured. In addition, the insured submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of a court of a sister state where the law presumably favored the plaintiff. The court held that the insured had conspired in bad faith to deceive the insurer. Consequently, the court
held the insurer not liable under the policy.
CHEEK: FACTS AND RATIONALE

The Cheek decision will have a significant impact on insurance
law in Illinois, as it requires the insurer to prove prejudice as a result
of non-cooperation by the insured. M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co.
issued a policy of liability insurance to George Cheek protecting him
from liability up to $10,000 per accident victim. The policy contained both an omnibus clause" and a standard cooperation
clause.5 On November 12, 1971, Cheek was riding in his car with
William Valleroy and two other persons when the car struck and
injured Harold Miller, a pedestrian. Cheek told the police that he
had been driving at the time of the accident. He submitted an
identical report to an adjuster for M.F.A., his insurer. These statements were corroborated by the other occupants of the vehicle.
Eight months later, Miller filed a complaint against Cheek for his
injuries, alleging negligence. The prayer for relief sought
$75,000-an amount far in excess of Cheek's policy limits. Cheek
immediately went to an M.F.A. office and informed his insurer that
it was Valleroy who was driving at the time of the accident.
M.F.A. advised Cheek by letter that it was no longer liable on the
57. 81 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Ill. 1948).
58. An omnibus clause extends coverage to anyone driving with the permission of the
named insured. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa National Mut. Insurance Co., 54 I1. 2d
333, 297 N.E.2d 163 (1973).
59. The clause in Cheek's policy read as follows:
Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured-The insured shall cooperate with the
Company, disclosing all pertinent facts known or available to him, and upon the
Company's request, assist in making settlements, in the conduct of suits and in
enforcing any right of contribution or indemnity against any person or organization
that may be liable to the insured with respect to which insurance is afforded under
the policy.
M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 34 I11.App. 3d 209, 211, 340 N.E.2d 331, 333 (5th
Cir. 1975).
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policy by reason of Cheek's breach of the cooperation clause. "
M.F.A. defended the negligence suit under a reservation of rights,'
and simultaneously filed a complaint against Cheek, Miller, and
Valleroy seeking a declaration of their rights under the policy. After
a trial, the court found for the defendants. M.F.A. appealed, asserting that Cheek's breach of the cooperation clause released it from
its obligations under the insurance contract.2
The Fifth District considered the arguments in favor of the material and substantial breach test and the prejudice standard, and
concluded that the latter was the better approach. The court observed:
The use of substantial and material breach standard is ordinarily
based on the argument that a liability insurance policy is a private
contract between an insured and an insurer, and that the contractual expectations of the parties should be protected by a strict
enforcement of the requirement of cooperation as a condition precedent to the insurer's duty to pay."3
Nevertheless, the court recognized a number of countervailing factors which suggested adoption of the prejudice standard. Initially,
the court recognized the fact that insurance contract terms are not
the product of bargaining but rather are dictated by the insurer."
The court further observed that liability insurance is no longer
"entirely a private matter between an insured and his insurer, and
that an accident victim has an interest in the proceeds of liability
insurance which cannot be easily disregarded." 5 The court viewed
the injured claimant as a third party beneficiary entitled to protection as a matter of public policy. Moreover, the material and substantial test permitted the insurer to seize upon any instance of noncooperation and thereby materially improve its position. 6 In effect
the insurer had a greater interest in the insured's breach of the
condition than in the insured's cooperation. Finally, the court noted
60. Apparently no issue of waiver was raised in the case.
61. For a discussion of reservation of rights and non-waiver agreements see the text accompanying notes 22 to 26 supra.
62. Neither Cheek nor Valleroy appeared in the declaratory judgment action. Notwithstanding this, the trial court entered judgment in their favor and dismissed M.F.A.'s complaint. In effect, the trial court had held that the cooperation clause had not been breached
and that the policy was not void. On appeal, the Fifth District Appellate Court affirmed the
trial court's ruling on the substantive law, but held that the trial court had committed a
procedural error by dismissing the complaint. The trial court should have entered an order
declaring the rights of the parties. 34 Il1. App. 3d at 220, 340 N.E.2d at 333.
63. 34 Il1. App. 3d 209, 215, 340 N.E.2d 331, 335-36 (5th Dist. 1975).
64. Id. at 216, 340 N.E.2d at 336.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 216-17, 340 N.E.2d at 336.
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that the prejudice standard had been accepted by a growing majority of American jurisdictions.6 7 In view of these arguments, the court
rejected the material and substantial test in favor of the prejudice
standard.
The supreme court affirmed, stressing the public policy rationale.
As did the appellate court, the supreme court began its analysis by
recognizing the "modern view" that a liability insurance policy is
more than a private agreement between the insurer and the insured.68 The court quoted extensively from an opinion from the
Washington Supreme Court:
Such an approach [the material and substantial breach standard]
places an undue emphasis on traditional, technical contract principles and their dubious application in cases of this nature. In
addition, insurance policies, in fact, are simply unlike traditional
contracts, i.e., they are not purely private affairs but abound with
public policy considerations, one of which is that the riskspreading theory of such policies should operate to afford to affected members of the public-frequently innocent third persons-the maximum protection possible consonant with fairness to
the insurer, [Citation.] It is manifest that this public policy consideration would be diminished, discounted, or denied if the insurer were relieved of its responsibilities although it is not prejudiced by the insured's actions or conduct in regard to its investigation or presentation and defense of the tort case. Such relief, absent a showing of prejudice, would be tantamount to a questionable windfall for the insurer at the expense of the public. 9
The court concluded that adherence to the lesser standard for determining the effect of a breach would be against the public interest.
The court found persuasive authority to support its public policy
rationale in the existence of public interest legislation regulating the
insurance industry. The court cited statutes requiring the inclusion
of certain terms in insurance policies,70 and alluded to the Financial
Responsibility Act 7 and the statutes requiring Uninsured Motorist
Coverage. If all Illinois drivers were required to have liability insurance, an inference could be drawn in favor of a strong public policy
in support of the prejudice test as adopted by the court. A compulsory insurance statute would indicate legislative intent that insur67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 217, 340 N.E.2d at 337.
M.F.A. Mutual Insurance v. Cheek, 66 Ill. 2d 492, 500-01, 363 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1977).
Id. at 501, 363 N.E.2d at 813.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 755 (2), 755.11, 755.19, 1000 (1975).
Id. at ch. 951/2, § 7-301 et. seq..
Id. at ch. 73, §755a.
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ance be available to all injured claimants, and would imply a concomitant legislative determination that the willful acts of an insured could not deprive the plaintiff of a statutorily created right.
However, Illinois does not have a statute requiring mandatory automobile insurance. Insurance in Illinois is only compulsory for a limited class of automobile operators.7 3 This fact implies that the scope
of the public's interest in automobile insurance is narrower than the
court suggests.
The court also relied on a series of decisions holding that an
injured claimant is a necessary party when a declaration voiding a
policy is sought. 74 For example, in Sobina v. Busby,75 the plaintiffs
were injured in Cook County by an automobile driven by an Alabama resident. After suit was brought in Illinois, the defendant's
insurance carrier brought an action in Alabama seeking a declaration that the policy was void due to material misrepresentations in
the application for insurance. Following a trial on the merits, the
Alabama court entered an order declaring the policy void. The insurer sought to use this Alabama judgment as a defense in a garnishment proceeding subsequent to trial of the negligence action in the
Illinois court. 7 The insurer argued that the Illinois court was bound
to give the Alabama judgment full faith and credit. The First District Appellate Court rejected the insurer's argument and held that
the Alabama court's judgment could not have determined the status
of the insurance policy unless the injured claimant was given notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Because of public policy, the court
in effect found that plaintiffs in a personal injury action have an
interest in liability insurance distinct from that of the insured.77
Although Sobina and its progeny are an important part of the
public policy justification in Cheek, the court did not address the
fact that the Sobina case was factually distinguishable. It is difficult
to see why notice and the mere fact that an injured claimant is a
necessary party in a declaratory judgment action should affect the
73. Only "persons whose drivers license and driving privileges have been revoked. . .or
who have failed to pay judgments..." are required to prove financial responsibility through
posting a bond or carrying insurance. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 7-301 (1975). However, there
was no showing in Cheek that the policy had been issued to satisfy the requirements of the
Act nor that Cheek himself was subject to its terms.
74. Williams v. Madison County Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 40 111. 2d 404, 240 N.E.2d 602
(1968); Fourniotis v. Woodward, 63 I1. App. 2d 79, 211 N.E.2d 571 (1st Dist. 1965); Sobina
v. Busby, 62 11. App. 2d 1, 210 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1965).
75. 62 Ill. App. 2d 1, 210 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1965).
76. If the insurer wishes to disclaim liability under the policy it answers "no funds" when
served with the garnishment citation. See Cuttone v. Peters, 67 111.App. 2d 1, 214 N.E.2d
499 (lst Dist. 1966).
77. 62 Ill. App. 2d 1, 210 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1965).
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interpretation of rights and duties of insurer and insured under a
contract of insurance. This interpretation does not logically or necessarily follow. At most Sobina could be read to require that an
insurer notify the injured party as well as the insured of a reservation of rights. Thus, the authority cited by the court in Cheek offers
no more than persuasive support for its conclusion that public policy is best served by a prejudice standard.
DETERMINATION OF PREJUDICE

In his text on Insurance Law, Keeton" identifies three separate
standards used by courts to determine whether the requisite degree
of prejudice is present. Some courts have adopted a strict 'but for'
standard which requires the insurer to show that if the insured had
cooperated, a contrary result would have been reached by the court
or jury. A few states employ a 'probably but for' test whereby the
insurer need show only a substantial likelihood that a different outcome would have resulted from the insured's cooperation. Finally,
some jurisdictions only require proof that the claim was substantially more dangerous, onerous or otherwise troublesome because of
the absence of cooperation. 9
When the strict 'but for' test is adopted the insurer rarely escapes
liability. Illustrative of decisions representing this approach is
Camire v. Commercial Insurance Co.5 0 in which the insured admitted on cross examination that he had fabricated an exculpatory
story. Finding the insurer had not been prejudiced, the court stated:
There has been no demonstration that the insurer defendant could
or would have savingly and equitably compromised the tort claim
or that the insurer's defense of the insured could have been more
effectively and withal creditably conducted had the insured seasonably communicated the objective truth to his insurer ...
There is no inductive cause in this case to believe that the ultimate
and rectified verdict in the tort action was not a commensurate
and just financial compensation for this plaintiff's injuries.,"
In the court's view where liability is clearly proven and the damages
78. KEErON, INSURANCE LAw §7.1(b) (1971).
79. The importance of the test chosen for determining prejudice is apparent when one
considers that "the effect of the non-compliance [with the cooperation clause] is unknowable
in any objective sense. . . .Any evaluation by court or jury as to the prejudicial effect of the
non-compliance must be entirely conjectural." Duty to Defend, supra note 14, at 1438. For
instance, if an insured fails to testify, no one can say with certainty what effect his testimony
would have had.
80. 160 Me. 112, 198 A.2d 168 (1964).
81. Id. at 122, 198 A.2d at 174.
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are not excessive, no prejudice results from an insured's failure to
cooperate. An unusual factual situation which resulted in a finding
of prejudice to the insurer under the first test is found in Fidelity
and Casualty Co. v. McConnaughy.2 In that case, the insurer rejected a settlement offer in reliance on the false statements of two
witnesses procured by the insured. At trial, the truth was disclosed,
and a verdict was rendered in excess of the settlement offer. In the
subsequent garnishment action, the court ruled that the insurer was
liable only to the extent of the settlement offer. The insured alone
was liable for the amount of the judgment exceeding that sum.
Relatively few jurisdictions have adopted the 'probably but for'
3
test. A typical example is Billington v. InterinsuranceExchange."
There, the lower court found the failure of the insured to appear at
trial to be a breach of the cooperation clause in that if the insured
had testified as expected the insurer could have set up a defense
based on assumption of the risk. On appeal, the California Supreme
Court remanded, holding that, to establish prejudice, it was first
necessary to show that the verdict probably would have been different had the additional evidence been heard. Mere inability to present evidence from which the jury might have rendered a different
decision would not be sufficient proof that the insurer was prejudiced.
The majority of jurisdictions have adopted the third standard.
Under this test it is sufficient to show that absent non-cooperation
the insurer's position would have been substantially easier to de4
the plaintiff claimed that
fend. For instance, in Brooks v. Haggard,"
the insurer was not prejudiced by the insured's failure to appear at
trial as the insurer was aware that the insured remembered little of
the accident. The court rejected this argument noting that the accident report could have refreshed the insured's memory. Courts
applying the third standard have also found prejudice when the act
of non-cooperation affected only the issue of damages. In Cameron
v. Berger," although the insured could not recall many details of the
accident, he was the only witness for the defense. The court held
that the insured's failure to attend the trial was prejudicial as a
lesser judgment might have otherwise resulted.
However, where the plaintiff can demonstrate the insurer easily
could have protected himself from the prejudice arising from the
82.
Breach
83.
84.
85.

228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117 (1962). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Comment,
of Corperation Clause of Liability Policy, 23 MD. L. REv. 245 (1963).
71 Cal. 2d 728, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326, 456 P.2d 982 (1969).
481 P.2d 131 (Colo. App. 1970).
336 Pa. 229, 7 A.2d 293 (1938).
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insured's non-cooperation, many courts hold that even the third test
for prejudice is not satisfied. In Peerless Insurance Co. v. Sheehan,"
the insurer asserted that the insured's failure to attend trial was a
breach of the cooperation clause. The court found that no prejudice
resulted from the insured's absence, for the insurer could have introduced into evidence testimony from the previous trial of the same
cause which had been remanded on an earlier appeal. In
Oberhansky v. Travelers Insurance,7 the insurer knew that the insured had recently accepted a new job out-of-state. The court found
that the insurer should have anticipated the insured's inability to
leave his new job to attend trial and should have taken his deposition to be introduced into evidence. Thus, the court held that the
insured's non-attendance at trial was excused. Moreover, the insured's unexcused failure to attend trial will not be deemed prejudicial if the plaintiff can prove that the insured's testimony would
have tended to harm rather than help the defense. In Pupkes v.
Sailors,""the insured lied about the facts of the accident and then
recanted. He also failed to attend the trial. At the subsequent garnishment hearing where he did testify, the judge viewed his testimony as unimpressive and detrimental to the insured's defense. On
appeal, the court relied on the impressions of the trial judge regarding the value of the insured's presence to the defense and found that
the insurer had not been prejudiced by the insured's failure to attend trial.
The supreme court in Cheek did not set forth any guidelines concerning what the test for prejudice should be in Illinois. The court
merely stated that "proof of substantial prejudice requires an insurer to demonstrate that it was actually hampered in its defense
by the violation of the cooperation clause." 9 The court cited with
approval the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Baumler v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.'" In Baumler, the plaintiff passenger was
injured while riding in a car driven by defendant Bailleres, an additional insured 9 under a policy written by defendant State Farm.
86. 194 So. 2d 285 (Fla. App. 1967).
87. 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P.2d 1093 (1956).
88. 183 Neb. 784, 164 N.W.2d 441 (1969).
89. 66 Ill. 2d 492, 500, 363 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1977).
90. 493 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1974).
91. An additional insured is a person described in the policy who is insured in addition
to the named insured. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 4.1(c) (1971). The most common additional
insureds are members of the named insured's household and persons operating the insured
vehicle with the permission of the named insured. Id. § 4.7 (a). An additional insured has
the same duty to cooperate as does the named insured. In Illinois, see Zitnik v. Burik, 395
111.182. 69 N.E.2d 888 (1946); Theetge v. Williams, 35 Ill. App. 2d 399, 182 N.E.2d 927 (1st
Dist. 1968).
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Bailleres misrepresented to State Farm that he was married to the
plaintiff. in reliance on his statements, the insurer suspended its
investigation because the insurance policy excluded coverage of interspousal torts. Upon learning the truth, State Farm withdrew
from the defense. Examining whether the breach of the cooperation
clause actually hampered the insurer in its defense, the court found
that State Farm had been prejudiced by its reliance on Bailleres's
falsehood which prompted it to stop its investigation and by Bailleres's failure to attend the trial. The court required neither a showing that the jury would otherwise have found for the defense nor
proof of a substantial likelihood that a different result would have
resulted if the insured had cooperated. 2
The Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on Baum ler suggests that
it would apply a similar test to determine whether the insurer had
been prejudiced by the insured's breach. It is apparent that under
the Baum ler standards, M.F.A. was not, in fact, prejudiced by
Cheek's and Valleroy's misstatements. M.F.A. learned the true
facts long before trial and had plenty of time to prepare its defense.
Moreover, under the omnibus clause, M.F.A. was liable whichever
story was believed.93
The majority in Cheek held that false statements corrected prior
to trial are not prejudicial if the insured would have been liable
under either set of facts. The court did not state any specific formula
to determine what is prejudicial; it merely said what is not prejudicial. Therefore, until an Illinois court finds that an insurer has been
prejudiced under a certain set of facts, it will not be clear what is
necessary to satisfy the standard.
CONCLUSION

Prior to Cheek the only factual issue which arose when an insurer
employed a policy defense based on the cooperation clause was
whether there was a material and substantial breach. Now the court
or jury must also decide whether or not the insurer was prejudiced
by the breach. Since the first issue must still be determined, decisions prior to Cheek remain viable. The theory of reciprocal duties
and the doctrine of excuse developed by the courts will remain
92. The Circuit Court of Appeals approved the trial court's instructions to the jury which
stated that to constitute a breach of the cooperation clause, the insurer had to prove only
that it was probably less able to resist a claim because of the insured's non-cooperation than
it would have been had the insured cooperated fully. 493 F.2d at 134.
93. 66 Ill. 2d 492, 497, 363 N.E.2d 809, 811-12 (1977). Under the omnibus clause anyone
driving with the permission of the named insured is covered. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
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relevant to the determination of the material and substantial breach
question.
Cheek's major significance may not rest solely with its effect upon
cooperation clause litigation. Rather, it represents explicit judicial
recognition of the public beneficiary doctrine of liability insurance
contracts. Under this theory, an injured claimant has rights in liability insurance which are judicially protected and may not be easily
defeated. The rights of the injured plaintiff are thereby permitted
to encroach on the contractual rights of the insured and the insurer.
Whether the theory of the public beneficiary will be expanded
beyond cooperation clause litigation to other areas of insurance law
is an open question. The rationale of Cheek may be applicable to
policy defenses based on breach of other policy conditions such as
the notice clause. The standard policy requires that the insured give
notice to the insurer of any accident "as soon as is practicable."9
This has been interpreted to require reasonable notice. 5 If the insurer does not get reasonable notice the policy is void.9 Heretofore,
Illinois courts have not required the insurer to show prejudice in
order to prevail in his policy defense. 7 Prejudice is merely one factor
which the court or jury may consider in determining whether the
notice was reasonable. However, the public policy rationale which
was the major justification in Cheek appears to be equally applicable to the question of notice. 9 The extension of the doctrine seems
foreordained.
CHARLES WEBSTER

94. A typical notice clause is as follows: "Notice. In the event of an accident, occurrence
or loss, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstances thereof, and
the names and addresses of the injured and of available witnesses, shall be given by or for
the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable. In the event
of theft the insured shall also promptly notify the policy." INSUR. L. REP. (CCH) Auto. Cas.
2350.
95. Johnson v. Samuels, 40 I1. App. 2d 417, 189 N.E.2d 780 (1st Dist. 1963).
96. Simmon v. Iowa Mut. Casualty Co., 3 III. 2d 318, 121 N.E.2d 509 (1954).
97. Kenworthy v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 28 Il. App. 3d 546, 328 N.E.2d 588 (4th Dist.
App. 3d 350, 317 N.E.2d 307 (2d Dist. 1974).
1975); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 22 Ill.
98. Id.
99. Cf. Simmon v. Iowa Mutual Casualty Co., 3 IIl. 2d 318, 121 N.E. 2d 509 (1954).

